This paper will focus on Darwall’s book, Philosophical Ethics. More specifically, I will be assessing the ideal judgment theory, a metaethical theory that Darwall covers in his book. Prior to my discussion of the individual metaethical theory, I will explain what Darwall calls the fundamental dilemma of metaethics. I will then examine how the ideal judgment theory provides a response to the fundamental dilemma of metaethics. Finally, I will conclude that we should not accept the ideal judgment theory because of its issues regarding the objectivity of ethical truths and circular reasoning.
Essentially, the fundamental dilemma of metaethics has to do with whether ethical facts exist or not. Darwall thinks that if there are ethical facts we must take the time to describe them and understand them. However, if it is the case that there are no ethical facts, we must explain what we’re doing when we talk about ethics. If there are ethical facts, we must figure out what they are. How do we go about figuring out what they are? Where do they come from? Can we ever know them? If there aren’t any, then what are we really talking about when we talk about ethics? As we discussed in class on April 20, 2022, it seems like there is such a thing as ethical purport. In other words, ethical judgments seem objective on the inside because it doesn’t seem to be about mere taste. In ethics, both people legitimately think they’re correct. Darwall brings up different metaethical theories in an attempt to address these sorts of fundamental disagreements. For the purpose of this paper, however, I will mainly be focusing on the ideal judgment theory and how it confronts the fundamental dilemma of metaethics.
First, I will provide a brief overview of the ideal judgment theory. According to Darwall, “[believers in the ideal judgment theory] hold that an ideal of ethical judgment is actually the independent variable and ethical truth is constituted by whatever deliverances (outputs) would emerge from that. They must argue, therefore, that standards of judgment can be derived internally, as flowing from the very idea of ethical judgment itself” (58). Moreover, the ideal judgment theory “agrees with Hume’s insight that ethical properties cannot be identified with any features of an object of ethical judgment. When we make an ethical judgment, we attribute an ethical property to something on the basis of features we take it to have”
(56). The ideal judgment theory provides a response to the fundamental dilemma of metaethics by claiming there are indeed ethical truths. However, unlike other metaethical theories, the ethical facts are not the independent variable, the ideal judges are. According to the ideal judgment theory, ethical facts are the dependent variable of the ideal judges. These ethical facts are what help us navigate fundamental disagreements about what’s right and wrong. According to the ideal judgment theory, what’s right or wrong is the verdict of some ideal judge. In other words, ethical truths are whatever we would converge on if we were more rational. More specifically, if we were rational in the sense that we were informed, dispassionate, and impartial, as those are the characteristics of an ideal judge (58-59). The very fact that ideal judges are deeming something as correct is what makes it an ethical truth. This contrasts with other metaethical theories such as ethical naturalism or theological voluntarism. This is because, according to the ideal judgment theory, ethical facts are not simply out there in the world scientifically, nor are they simply ethical facts because God commands them so.
One strength of the ideal judgment theory is that it seems some of our disagreements would get resolved if we were thinking more clearly in the way an ideal judge should. For example, since the ideal judge must be informed, they are sufficiently aware of the inputs and outputs of the situation (58). It only seems logical that in order to make a proper judgment that an ideal judge should be clear about all the components of the case. All major details are being taken into consideration. Moreover, as stated on page 59, if ideal judges are dispassionate in the sense that they are “uninfluenced by emotions directed at something other than the object under evaluation” they are not being swayed by influences that are entirely irrelevant to the case at hand. Moreover, as discussed on page 59 if ideal judges are impartial, everyone is to be given the same interest and concern, unless of course there is a relevant difference. This appears to make things much more objectively fair.
While there are clear strengths of the ideal judgment theory as it seems it would resolve various disagreements through ethical truths, the extent to which it could do so seems controversial. For example, on page 60 Darwall brings up the issue of differing cultures. For example, two individuals from two different cultures may very well be perfectly informed, dispassionate, and impartial yet still make conflicting judgments. Would this mean that there are no objective ethical truths? Perhaps not, but it appears the ideal judgment theory is not perfectly objective. This seems problematic for the ideal judgment theory considering it claims that ideal judges are able to come to agreements about objective ethical truths. On page 60 Darwall gives what I consider to be his most promising response to this issue. “Perhaps the most that an ideal judgment theory could say is that relative to one cultural context of ethical judgment, the first judgment is true, whereas relative to the other cultural context, the second is true” (60). In hopes of holding our focus on the ideal judgment theory, I would like to make the following clarification: while this sort of cultural relativism does threaten the objectivity of the ideal judgment theory, it does not make the theory altogether relativist. Relativism has to do with fundamental differences beyond this sort of non-ethical disagreement (66-67). Regardless, this sort of cultural relativism does seem to threaten the objectivity at the heart of the ideal judgment theory.
An even more troubling weakness of the ideal judgment theory has to do with its circular reasoning as in the Euthyphro dilemma. Logically, it is unclear whether the ideal observer approves of things because they’re right to begin with. Perhaps, ideal observers are merely coming to a conclusion about a truth that already exists. If this is so, the ideal judge would no longer be the independent variable with ethical facts being the dependent variable. This is because the decisions made by ideal judges would no longer be what constitutes ethical truth. The ethical facts would have been there prior to any sort of judgment. Additionally, this causes problems for the theory at the foundational level because in order for a theory to be foundational, the theory needs to claim that things are right in virtue of the fact that an ideal judge would approve of them.
In conclusion, I do not think we should accept the ideal judgment theory. The validity of the theory rests on the fact that there are objective ethical truths and that we could only come to these truths if we acted as ideal judges. However, the issue of cultural relativism pokes holes in the argument for objective truths. Moreover, the ideal judgment theory comes apart logically due to its use of circular reasoning. In the end, it is unclear whether or not ethical truths really are the verdict of an ideal judge.
