Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason explained that because God was omniscient, wholly good, and wise that He was able to choose the best possible universe and create it for mankind. Leibniz believed that God could not, and would not have created a better universe. Within this universe, there are necessary evils and suffering, but they were essential to creating the best possible universe. To explain his theory, Leibniz distinguishes between three kinds of evil: metaphysical, physical, and moral in order to explain why there should be any evil in the first place.
There are several theories about how the world was created, the two most popular being the Big Bang Theory/evolution and the theory that God created the world. However, Leibniz didn’t see the creation of the world as a point for debate. The only logical culprit, according to Leibniz, for who created the world, was God. “And this intelligence cause ought to be infinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in power, in wisdom, and in goodness, since it relates to all that which is possible. Furthermore, since all is connected together, there is no ground for admitting more than one. Its understanding is the source of essences, and its will is the origin of existences. There in few words is the proof of one only God with his perfections, and through him the origin of things,” (360). Leibniz believed that no other being possessed all the perfect qualities necessary in order to create the universe; as no ordinary being could have possibly known what the infinity of other worlds were like, and provided mankind with the best one of them. In addition, according to Leibniz, it is only logical that one being be the source of this world, and that it must be God and God alone who created it.
Some argue that it is impossible to know for sure that we are in the best world considering we’ve never experienced anything else. However, Leibniz argued that the case must be that God created the best world for us because if he hadn’t, something would have interfered with Him to give us the optimal universe. “Now this supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less infinite, cannot but have chosen the best. For as a lesser evil is a kind of good, even so a lesser good is a kind of evil that stands in the way of a greater good; and there would be something to correct the actions of God if it were possible to do better… “if there were not the best (optimum) among all possible worlds, God would not have produced it,” (361). However, this all relies on the premise that God, under any circumstance, would do what is best for His people. How can we know that God wanted us to live in a good world, but not only a good world, but the best of them all? Though this question is complex, the very definition of God requires that he do good and promote the best outcomes for mankind, which would mean choosing the finest world available (360).
Moreover, Leibniz claimed that because God is both good and omniscient, that he weighed the outcomes of choosing other worlds. He considered the effects of inflicting all degrees of evil and came to the conclusion that a certain degree of evil would be necessary in the ideal world. “Thus if the smallest evil that comes to pass in the world were missing in it, it would no longer be this world; which, with nothing omitted and all allowance made, was found the best by the creator who chose it,” (361). Critics of Leibniz suggest that there would be more cumulative good if there were less evil, and that more good would be better. Leibniz rebuttals this point by explaining that evil is necessary to achieve certain good outcomes. “We know, moreover, that often an evil brings forth a good whereto one would not have attained without that evil… A general sometimes makes a fortunate mistake which brings about the winning of a great battle,” (361). Even still, some critics don’t find that this sufficiently explains the existence of evil.
To further rationalize the existence of evil, Leibniz introduced three kinds of evil: metaphysical evil, physical evil, and moral evil. “Metaphysical evil consists in mere imperfection” Leibniz asserts on page 363. What Leibniz meant by this was that imperfections and evils must exist in order for the world to exist because if there were no imperfections, it would be only God who exists. “For we must consider that there is an original imperfection in the creature before sin, because the creature is limited in its essence; whence it follows that it cannot know all, and that it can deceive itself and commit other errors,” (363).
Leibniz also discussed physical evils, which include natural disasters, illness, etc. as a form of divine punishment. “One may say of physical evil, that God wills it often as a penalty owing to guilt, and often also as a means to an end, that is, to prevent greater evils or to obtain greater good,” (364). This was one of Leibniz’s weaker points because it can be said that some people suffer more from physical evils than others, even if they’ve done less punishable things. However, Leibniz also suggested that evil allows for a more genuine appreciation of the good and that in extreme cases even permits “greater perfection in him who suffers it”…“The seed that one sows is subject to a kind of corruption before it can germinate; this is a beautiful similitude, which Jesus Christ himself used,” (364). The use of Ethos here when referencing God makes Leibniz appear more credible and knowledgeable on the subject because God is a highly respected figure.
Finally, Leibniz touches on ‘moral evil’ which he characterizes as the evil brought on by human beings. Leibniz applies the ‘free will defence’ to explain that if people are to truly have free will, that they must be able to act badly. God, being all-powerful is fully capable of preventing such evil; however, he permits it in order to produce the best world possible one that contains “free human agents,” (360). It may appear here that God wills evil and not good as Leibniz claims he does. However, God wills good as a consequence not an antecedent. “The consequent will of God, which has sin for its object, is only permissive,” (364). God is not promoting sin, he is only giving people free will, which He found leads to the best outcome.
Most, if not all of Leibniz’s arguments rely on a single bold premise: that God wants the best for everyone and aims to promote good. If Leibniz’s premise were false and God did not aim to promote good, then many of Leibniz’s points would no longer be valid. If that was the case, the notion that we are living in the best world possible would become invalid. Subsequently, the supposed purpose of evil would also become invalid. However, as previously stated, one could argue that the very definition of God requires that God be good, meaning that the premise is in fact true. Therefore, any evil that God permits is necessary due to the fact that he is wholly good and wise and would not have allowed for evil if it would not have led to the best world possible. “But God being inclined to produce as much good as possible, and having all the knowledge and power necessary for that, it is impossible that in him there be fault, or guilt, or sin; and when he permits sin, it is wisdom, it is virtue,” (364).
Bibliography
Cottingham, John, editor. Western Philosophy An Anthology. Second ed., Blackwell Publishing, 2008.
