In this paper, I will critically assess contractarianism and the ideal observer theory. I will focus on realistic contractarianism and the main form of ideal observer theory, although there are variations of each. To assess the two theories I will provide an overview of the central features of each theory and then explain areas in which they overlap and differ. I will end the paper with my personal perspective claiming that contractarianism is the more plausible foundational theory.
Before I can compare and contrast contractarianism and ideal observer theory, I must first discuss them as individual foundational theories. I will begin with a brief discussion of contractarianism. Put plainly, contractarianism is asking what set of rules a reasonable group of people would agree to. For the purpose of this paper, when I solely mention “contractarianism”, I am referring to realistic contractarianism. According to the author of Normative Ethics Shelly Kagan, “The name [contractarianism] comes, of course, from thinking of the members of the group as seeking to establish the terms of a social contract, one agreed upon by all parties, and binding upon all parties. Following common practice, we can call the parties to the contract, those attempting to come to an agreement, the bargainers” (241). These bargainers, at least in realistic contractarianism, while reasonable, are ordinary. They are fallible, have biases, weaknesses, etc. These sorts of limitations are reflected in the rules they create. It is important to note that what actually makes contractarianism a foundational theory is that the valid moral rules are those that the bargainers would agree to. What makes the terms of the contract binding by virtue is the fact itself that they’d be agreed upon (241).
Contractarianism, of course, has more features than adumbrated by my summary above. I will get into some of those complexities during my discussion of the similarities and differences between contractarianism and ideal observer theory. Beforehand, I will provide a brief overview of the ideal observer theory. According to Kagan, the central idea of the ideal observer theory is that “valid moral judgments are valid by virtue of the very fact that they would be endorsed by a suitably specified ideal observer” (272). And that main type of ideal observer is perfectly informed, rational, and impartial. Similar to Kagan, and for purposes of simplicity, I am going to restrict my discussion of contractarianism to the rule version. Thus, an act is only deemed morally permissible if it conforms to the set of rules that would be endorsed by the ideal observer (272). I would like to highlight the fact that in this theory the ideal observer is outside of the situation. In other words, the ideal observer is unbiased in a way so that they have “no particular ties to particular individuals” (279).
It seems as though both contractarianism and the ideal observer theory require some sort of group decision-making. However, people have natural differences and those differences can lead to disagreements. What happens for example, as Kagan brings up on page 275, if there is disagreement among the ideal observers about if something is forbidden. If the ideal observers, in this case, were required to note their differences and compromise where necessary, then this would be similar to a certain kind of contractarianism, namely one with idealized bargainers. However, in realistic contractarianism, the main form I’d like to focus on, where the bargainers are not perfectly rational or informed, this sort of compromise may not be possible. Moreover, in contractarianism, the very people making decisions are the same people who will be bound to the terms of their agreement. Ideal observers on the other hand are further removed from the situation and are not bound to the terms of their agreement (275).
Moreover, there is a point of overlap between contractarianism and ideal observer theory regarding the process of choosing which rules to endorse. For example, the ideal observer goes through a sort of deliberation during which they consider arguments for and against a rule, choosing the rule with the weightier argument (277). Similarly, bargainers within contractarianism must choose the rules in such a way that a reasonable group of people would govern their interactions. This requires a similar sort of assessment to the ideal observer. In both situations, there is a systematic and logical kind of decision-making. And as I stated earlier, for both the ideal observer and the bargainers in contractarianism, what’s morally right is what the ideal observers and bargainers choose as being right. That being said, the assessments of the rules vary slightly between ideal observers and contractarian bargainers because ideal observers are not bound to the rules they agree upon as the bargainers are. Again, bargainers assess rules knowing they will be required to follow those rules. However, it is unclear whether this discrepancy is one of importance as the rules should end up fair regardless. Even though ideal observers are not bound to the rules, because of their unbiased nature, they should be able to endorse rules objectively without favoring one group or person. I will circle back to this idea of contractarian fairness toward the end of my paper when I discuss Rawl’s veil of ignorance.
I find contractarianism to be the more plausible theory in comparison to the ideal observer theory. A compelling argument against the ideal observer theory as a foundational theory has to do with its circular reasoning as in the Euthyphro dilemma. Does the ideal observer approve of things because they’re right to begin with? Are they simply hunting down a truth that’s already out there? This is problematic because, in order for a theory to be foundational, the theory needs to claim that things are right in virtue of the fact that an ideal observer would approve of them. There are smaller technical problems with the ideal observer theory as well. However, the most fundamental counterargument for ideal observers is the one regarding the Euthyphro dilemma. Contractarianism on the other hand seems much more plausible due to the fact that it’s not required that bargainers be perfectly informed and perfectly rational. The fact that bargainers will be required to live by the rules they come up with ensures the contract will be binding by virtue of the fact that bargainers would approve of them. However, if we take a Hobsean approach to contractarianism, we may worry that if the bargainers were in positions of power they’d only decide upon rules that favor the powerful. However, I find that this concern is easily addressed by Rawls’ veil of ignorance. If we take Rawls’ approach, the rules turn out fair because in this case, bargainers are trying to determine what rules a reasonable group of people would choose to govern their interactions if they didn’t know their place in society. In this case, it wouldn’t make sense to make rules that only benefit the powerful because you might not reap those benefits.
In conclusion, I find (realistic) contractarianism to be the more plausible foundational theory. The ideal observer theory comes apart logically due to its use of circular reasoning. Moreover, it is simply too unrealistic because it requires that observers must be perfectly rational, perfectly informed, and perfectly impartial.
